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There are at least two ways in which emotions can be 
conceptualized. The first, and most widespread, one is the 
cognitive approach which implies the presence of internal processes 
or psychological mechanisms. The cognitive approach says that 
emotions are the result of evolutionary processes. The second 
approach is behaviorological. It states that emotions are learned 
and are nothing more than behaviorological and physiological 
events. Both approaches, even if different, have an extremely 
important effect on our world because they may help make societal 
decisions and therefore manage our environment in a better way. As 
we will see, though, authorities do not always look at the research 
before making critical judgements. 
My goal in this paper is twofold: First it is to review 
several lines of research on how certain emotions -namely guilt and 
shame- "evolved":. Second, it is to show that, unfortunately, the 
general public and city officials often make decisive judgements 
without referring to the research that has been done on the 
subject. After introducing the main theories of emotions and 
describing the behaviorological perspective, I will comment on the 
hasty and unwise decisions that are being make nationwide to reduce 
the rate of recidivism of criminals. But before I present the 
applied part, and in order for the reader to understand better the 
different theories of emotions, let me introduce you to some lines 
of research. 
First, according to Izard (1977) guilt, like other fundamental 
emotions emerged through evolutionary-biological processes, with 
the adaptive functions of preventing waste and exploitation. In 
this view, feelings of responsibility and desire to make amends for 
wrongdoing have survival value for individuals and relationships 
and, in the long term for societies and civilization. Izard quotes 
the Anthropologist LaBarre (1959) who states that: 
As they evolved, animals became competitive (for food) and had 
to develop ways and means of getting along with each other, or 
chaos would result and the species would not survive. 
In a book by Tuttman, Izard also quotes psychologist Helen 
Lewis (Tuttman et al 1981) who states that: 
Everywhere anthropologists have looked, they have found human 
beings organized with a society ruled by cultural laws governing 
the interactions of its members. These cultural laws clearly 
invade every moment of an individual's experience from birth to 
burial ceremonies. 
second, Leo Madow (1988) explains that sociologists and 
anthropologists have suggested that systems of moral law have 
evolved culturally as a necessary means of adapting to the 
vicissitudes of our environment. 
Madow continues saying that where cultural laws have evolved 
for the purpose of survival of the species, there must also develop 
a sense of right and wrong behavior, which then would establish a 
feeling of guilt if we do wrong. We also developed typed of 
behavior that would allow us to live in peace with our neighbors. 
We do not steal another's food or mate. If we do, it could lead to 
mortal combat and eventually threaten species survival. 
It is considered by many that we all have a conscience that is 
fundamental and without that conscience, society could not have 
survived. By Darwin's laws of evolution, this conscience became 
heritable. Racial traits are genetically inherited whereas 
cultural traits are socially inherited, that is biology governs 
physical and cultural rules social activity. 
Humans had to develop a definition of right and wrong in 
culture so as to better survive. From this beginning, they 
developed some reaction within themselves if they did something 
wrong, which could well have been the primordial beginnings of a 
"sense" of guilt. 
Madow explains that cultural anthropologists suggest that 
there are at least three purposes for the heritable development of 
a sense of guilt. 
The first is to control aggressive competitive drives so that 
the human animal does to annihilate itself. 
The second is to control unbridled sexual behavior so that the 
family unit is preserved, again permitting survival of the species. 
The third purpose for a sense of guilt arises because of the 
prolonged infantilization of the child, who must please his or her 
parents (that is, be "aware" of what is "right" behavior and what 
is "wrong" behavior and develop a sense of guilt regarding what is 
wrong behavior) in order to survive. 
In an evolutionary sense, then, guilt, beginning with guilty 
fear, was essential at first for the survival of Homo sapiens and 
then for survival of various societies into which humans organized. 
Third, Barrett and Campos (1987) ( whose research I 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 at the end of the paper) treat 
emotions as the "bidirectional process of establishing, maintaining 
and/or disrupting significant relationships between and organism 
and the [ ••• ] environment". They discuss three important 
relationships between event and organism. The first one is genetic 
and need not be learned. The second source of significance for 
Barrett and Campos is social communication. Even though we have 
built-in abilities, interaction gives an exponential perspective to 
event-organism relationships. The third source of significance is 
what they call "the organism's goals and strivings". They explain 
that these, unlike genetically biological processes, can be learned 
and that the organism constantly strives for the fulfillment of 
these goals. 
Barrett and Campos believe that there are different "member of 
emotion families" that emerge from 1) prewired significance, 2) 
ability of the organism to cope with the environment, 3) the 
average environment in which the organism is evolving, and 4) the 
expression of facial, vocalic and physiological patterns depending 
on the environment. 
Fourth, Barrett (1994) defines shame as involving the whole 
individual while guilt involves only definite actions. Shame 
involves hiding while guile involves making amends. Buss (1980) 
says that shame involves social anxiety while guilt involves self-
hatred. Barrett believes that shame helps the "self" develop 
during early development. She believes that a relationship between 
an organism and the environment is only important if it has some 
repercussions on the individual's "adaptive-functioning". 
Finally, Malatesta and Wilson (1988) (summarized in Tables 1 
and 2) propose a model which purports that emotions are adaptive or 
maladaptive acts. They propose that some individuals are 
predisposed to experience certain emotions more so than others and 
that, as a result, we all react differently to the world. They 
believe that each emotion serves to "facilitate commerce with the 
environment" and that some of them overtake personality in altering 
consciousness in biased ways. They believe that "people possess 
implicit internal representations of social interactions that guide 
interpersonal behavior". They think that a care giver's behavior 
is dependant on the "pre-existing" qualities that the infant has -
which is what some call "temperament". This theory, and the former 
ones are in contrast with the behavioral perspective that I would 
like to introduce at this time. 
As Barrett (1994) points out, most researchers disagree about 
what constitutes a basic emotion. They claim that there is no 
common definition of what it is they are observing. Some say that 
a basic emotion is one where a facial response is perceived (e.g., 
Izard and Malatesta, 1987), some consider that it is "the one with 
the clearest imagery" (e.g., Shaver et al. 1987) and others think 
it is some "fundamental units out of which more sophisticated 
emotions are built" (e.g. see Izard and Malatesta, 1987). But ask 
the behaviorologist when we talk of guilt or shame, what do we 
really talk about? 
We talk about emotional physiological reactions that are 
rearoused by conditions that have been present in the past when 
punishment has occurred. "feeling guilty" has become a conditioned 
response. When we feel guilty or ashamed we feel the conditioned 
response of smooth muscles and glands plus the change in the 
probability of and operant behavior. stomach contractions, bile 
secretions, contractions or relaxation of small blood vessels, 
pounding heart, sweating are some of the stimuli to which we react 
by saying that we "feel an emotion". We usually respond to these 
stimuli in combination with other stimuli from the non-internal 
environment. So, one of the conditions necessary for guilt and 
shame appears coincident with the occurrence of a previously 
punished behavior, or even simply upon the external stimulus 
occasion for such a behavior. When Dr. Karen Pryor says "No" to 
her cat, it elicits an emotional state in the cat appropriate to 
past instances of punishment. Then, the behavior of the cat may be 
controlled simply by saying "No" because the verbal stimulus 
arouses and emotional condition that is incompatible with the 
behavior we are trying to control. so, humans, like all other 
organisms, experience "guilt" as a physiological and a 
behaviorological change. 
Madow and Izard do a good job of describing the functions of 
emotions. Malatesta and Wilson along with Barrett and Campos have 
some interesting perspectives 
and 2- but all this is 
that I have combined in Tables 1 
just behavior, would say the 
behaviorologist. For millennia, guilt and shame as ill defined 
concepts have been used by humans to control others' behavior. By 
"shaming" someone into doing something we force their behavior. 
The person that is being "shamed" is escaping from a conditioned 
aversive verbal stimulus. To escape from the aversive condition the 
shamed person must change their behavior. we often say that guilt 
and shame are used in our society to control people's behavior. 
our actions are too often based on aversive stimulation, i.e. by 
presenting aversive stimuli and then making their removal 
contingent upon the response that we are trying to strengthen. 
Government control is based on making illegal behavior generate 
aversive stimuli which, society hope, will make criminals "feel 
guilty". Behaving legally provokes positive reinforcement, and 
therefore the avoidance of guilt and shame feelings. 
Shame, guilt and other emotions are learned according to the 
behavior scientist. It is because of a history of punishment that 
the child develops a "sense of guilt". Those guilty feelings have 
developed in most societies because the use of aversive 
conditioning is faster and easier than the use of positive 
reinforcement, even though the latter is the most effective to 
strengthen what society considers "appropriate behavior". 
What I have tried to do in this first part is review both the 
cognitive and behaviorological approaches. It is obvious that the 
main advantage of the behaviorological approach is that it does not 
make assumptions and limits itself to observable events -whether 
they be internal or external. The cognitive approach, though, has 
some interesting ideas that seem to many to be more "complete". At 
any rate it is while reviewing the various research, that I came to 
react to the decisions that were being make nationwide for the 
reduction of recidivism in criminals. Let me introduce you to 
those decisions and the reason why I disagree with them. 
on February 17th 1995, the Morning Edition of National Public 
Radio (N.P.R.) broadcasted a talk titled "Cities Try to Shame 
Prostitutes and Johns out of Town". N. P.R. 's reporter Wendy 
Kaufman questioned some authorities in the city of Kent to expose 
the problem of whether or not public humiliation and shame acts as 
a deterrent to crime. Cities like Boston or Seattle are displaying 
the names and sometimes photographs of criminals or offenders 
particularly those involved in prostitution. Even though there is 
no data to support the notion that public embarrassment will deter 
crime, city officials are under so much pressure to decrease crime 
that they are decided to try anything to solve the problem. The 
cable broadcast run several times a day in a city like Kent, 
Washington, spelling out the names of recently convicted offenders 
and what they were convicted of. In Boston, the city is showing 
videotaped pictures of those convicted. In Aurora, Colorado, the 
city is buying adds in newspapers to publish the photographs of the 
men arrested for soliciting. 
But aren't shame and humiliation potentially destructive 
feeling-inducing techniques? Could it be that inducing such 
feelings is detrimental to the offenders and especially to their 
families? Is it not a harsh punishment for first time offenders? 
such displays of identities may destroy families; people may find 
themselves labeled. In large cities such as Boston, many people 
have the same name as a person who has been convicted. All these 
are relevant problems but the main question still remains will the 
broadcasts with their powerful emphasis on shame and ridicule 
actually and effectively deter crime? 
According to Bradshaw, much criminal behavior is reenactment, 
i.e. a criminal offender criminalizes in the same manner that he 
was victimized in the past (Brashaw, 1988, 3-23). While we cannot 
say that all criminals act out of their own shame, there is some 
data to show that it may often be the case. criminals often feel 
rejected and have a relatively high level of shame. 
Names do hurt, and they often lead to anger and retaliation. 
Scheff and Retzinger (1994) think that shame is a key mediator in 
the relationship between insult, anger and aggression. When it is 
repressed or disguised, shame leads to anger and aggression. When 
individuals are open about their shame, it leads to compromise 
negotiation and problem solving. Scheff and Retzinger believe that 
open communication of emotions is functional, whereas indirect 
communications and repression are dysfunctional. They also believe 
alienation and the repression of shame leads to interpersonal 
aggression. People -and ,we can suppose, especially criminals-
often conceal shame because they perceive it as a weakness. 
Because of the repression of shame in modern society, the shamed 
persons become trapped. They are ashamed of being ashamed. Scheff 
and Retzinger also describe anger as "a protest against the loss of 
affectional bonds" and as a mean by which to protect vulnerability 
of the self. Escalation of feelings is likely when bonds are 
threatened and when feelings are not commented upon. Historically, 
Hitler can be seen as an example of the negative effects of 
humiliation. The shame and humiliation of World War I motivated 
Hitler and his followers to seek revenge. According to Scheff and 
Retzinger, all human violence occurs when the parties to a conflict 
are alienated from each other and are in a state of shame, and when 
the alienation and shame are acknowledged. 
Scheff and Retzinger study marital conflict in order to 
examine the relationship between shame and aggression. For 
example, they ask couples to discuss issues about which they have 
quarrelled in the past. The authors identify negative comments 
about the self and nonverbal cues (e.g. aversion of gaze, 
fidgeting, wrinkled foreheads) as displays of shame, and find that 
shame cues precede "disrespectful" behavior in these incidents. 
Thus, according to their data, shame produces that anger which 
results in aggressive behavior. Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher and 
Gramzow (Tangney et al. 1992), using the Self Conscious Affect and 
Attribution Inventory along with the Symptom Checklist 90 and the 
spielberger Trait Anger Scale, found that shame-proneness was 
consistently positively correlated with anger arousal, irritability 
and indirect expressions of hostility. Such a shame-to-anger 
linkage is consistent with numerous clinical observations (e.g. 
Kinston, 1987; Lewis, 1971; Nathanson 1987; Retzinger, 1987; 
Scheff, 1987). Moreover, empirical studies suggest that anger is 
likely to be engendered by threats to one's self-esteem. As 
suggested by Lewis (1971) and Miller (1985), shamed individuals may 
be motivated to anger because such anger is likely to provide some 
relief from the global self-condemning, and debilitating experience 
of shame. 
Katz (1988) analyzed the descriptions of vandalism, robbery 
theft and murder and found that the perpetrator felt humiliated and 
had committed the crime as an act of revenge. Katz says "The 
would-be killer must undergo a particular emotional process. He 
must transform what he usually senses as an eternally humiliating 
situation into a blinding rage" (11). Rather than acknowledge his 
or her shame the offender masks it with anger. Lansky's research 
on family violence (1984, 1987, 1989) reports that underhanded 
disrespect gives rise to shame, which leads in turn to anger and 
violence. The relationship between collective violence and shame 
has been suggested in a recent analysis of the Attica riots 
(Scheff, Retzinger, and Ryan 1989). Violence of the guards toward 
the inmates began with a series of events that the guards perceived 
as humiliating. The assault of the guards on the prisoners 
followed Lewis' sequence: insult, unacknowledged shame, rage and 
aggression. 
Thus the pain of shame, and its resulting (temporary) loss of 
self esteem, may give rise to unfocused anger and hostility. Such 
shame-based anger can then be easily directed toward others. 
Tangney indicates that previous studies have show that there 
is a positive link between guilt and empathy (Tangney 1991). Thus 
in cases of interpersonal harm, the guilt-prone individual's 
response is likely to be modulated by empathy and concern, 
diffusing the potential for anger and hostility that · is so 
prominent in the case of shame. In a number of respects, then, 
guilt -not shame- appears to be the more "moral" emotion. Guilt-
inducing techniques could probably be used more effectively than 
shame-inducing ones by city officials in their fight for the 
reduction of crime in our towns. Research on emotions and in 
particular guilt and shame seems to many like a long and useless 
process. Research, though, has enabled us to better understand 
ourselves, the way we act, react and why we feel what we feel. But 
is also has a societal impact by giving us the tools necessary for 
making judicious decisions and by improving our environment through 
prevention rather that postvention. 
Tamara, 
I reviewed my paper and followed the corrections that you emailed 
me from the Netherlands. 
I really found your remarks and suggestions extremely useful. I 
made all the changes you proposed. As far as the distinction 
between the works of Malatesta & Wilson, Barrett and the behavioral 
perspective is concerned, I would like to say that even though the 
differences between perspectives may not appear obvious to the 
reader, they do exist. I strongly believe that a radical 
Cheneyrian -that is, a conservative behaviorist- would not 
differentiate guilt and shame and investigate those differences the 
way Malatesta & Wilson or Barrett have. That is why I thought 
interesting to make a distinction between those perspectives. 
I strongly believe your point is valid though and that some would 
say that the distinction is not clear. 
I am a little late to give this thesis to the Honors' program. I 
hope they will be fine with it though. 
Thank you very much for your help and supervision, all your 
directions greatly improved and enhanced my work. 
I hope we will have an opportunity to work together again. 
we missed you at the wedding. Heidi came but seemed bored ••• There 
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